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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHARON GARLAND, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
- v s - ] 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
i BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
i Case No. 880344-CA 
> Category 14(b) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
Respondent agrees with the jurisdictional allegations 
and description of the nature of the case as set forth in 
Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether or not the Trial Court awarded Appellant a 
$212,000 judgment against Respondent? 
2. Whether or not the Trial Court abused its discre-
tion by not awarding Appellant her attorneys1 fees and 
costs. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS 
1. Because Appellant did not want the responsibility 
to maintain the parties1 real property, the Trial Court 
awarded said properties to the Respondent and gave the Ap-
pellant a cash equivalent. Realizing that the Respondent 
would be required to maintain, manage and sell the 
properties, the Trial Court allowed Respondent to pay Appel-
lant $212,000 over an eleven (11) year period and ruled that 
no interest would accrue until payments became delinquent. 
Respondent contends that this ruling constituted an order to 
pay that can be reduced to a judgment only in the event an 
installment becomes delinquent and then only in the amount 
of the delinquency installment. 
2. The Trial Court awarded Appellant $8,637.62 cash, 
$1,000 per month alimony, $1,000 per month child support and 
$212,000 payable over eleven (11) years and, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion by not awarding Appellant her 
attorneys1 fees. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. To determine whether, the Trial Court made certain 
findings, the Court of Appeals can consider the ruling of 
the Trial Court and the findings together.(1) 
In order to ascertain whether the Trial Court awarded 
Appellant a $212,000 judgment or ordered Respondent to pay 
that sum over an eleven (11) year period, reference must be 
made to the bench ruling of the Trial Court. (See Exhibit 
"A11 attached hereto at pages 8 and 9.) The ruling was: 
^
1;
 See Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 293 P.2d 
689 (Utah 19 56) ; Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
"Now, if I have done my arithmetic right, and when 
you get these added up, you know, if I have done 
some arithmetic wrong, we will fix it. If I have 
done my arithmetic right, I figure he got in the 
separation $212,000, he'd have to give her to make 
this equal. And that's what I am going to require 
him to give to her and in this way: I am going to 
require that he pay to her $12,000 in cash by July 
1st, and then by December 31st he pay to her 
$20,000 in cash, and continue to pay that for the 
next ten years until that is fully paid.11 
"MR. PETERSON: $10,000?" 
"THE COURT: $20,000. $20,000 a year for ten 
years. And that will not accrue interest. And 
the reason I am not adding interest onto that is 
because he is stuck with some very economic 
assets, unfortunately, and he is going to have to 
try to market the various pieces of real property 
and all those kind of things that she didn't want 
the responsibility for, and so I am not going to 
require him to pay any interest on that unless 
those payments become delinquent. If they do be-
come delinquent, then he is going to have to pay 
them interest at the judgment rate they are past 
due." 
From this ruling, counsel for Appellant prepared Con-
clusion of Law number 15 (Record p.189) and paragraph 14 of 
the Decree (Record p.194) to grant Appellant a $212,000 
judgment against the Respondent. This was erroneous and 
paragraph 14 of the Decree was corrected by Stipulation and 
Order, see Exhibit "B" attached hereto. 
The Trial Court ordered the Respondent to pay Appellant 
$12,000 on or before July 1, 1988, $20,000 on or before 
December 31, 1988 and $20,000 each year thereafter until Ap-
pellant received $212,000. This order parallels an order to 
pay child support and alimony. It is prospective in nature 
and is only converted to a judgment in the event and in the 
amount of a delinquency. If Respondent fails to pay Appel-
lant the $12,000 by July 1, 1988, she is entitled to bring 
an order to show cause and obtain a $12,000 judgment, bear-
ing interest as provided by statute, against the Respondent; 
if the payment is timely made, no judgment would issue as to 
that payment. 
Applicable and analogous to this issue is the recently 
enacted statute entitled "Payment under child support order 
- Judgement11 found at Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-10.6 
(1988) which reads: 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or 
spousal support under any child support order, as 
defined by Subsection 62A-11-401 (3), is, on and 
after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and 
effect of any judgment of a district court, except 
as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith 
and credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; 
and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification 
by this or any other jurisdiction, except as 
provided in Subsection (2). 
The Trial Court clearly stated in its ruling that it 
was attempting to equally balance the cash to be paid to the 
Appellant and the property to be received by the Respondent. 
To award the Appellant a $212,000 judgment would have dis-
turbed the equality of the award. The Supreme Court of 
Idaho looked at this issue in State v. McNichols, 115 P.2d 
104 (Idaho 1941), and ruled that to determine whether the 
action of the Trial Court was an "order" or a "judgment11 we 
look to the content of the ruling not its title. 
In analysing the content of the Trial Court's ruling, 
it is,important to note that during the trial Appellant 
requested that she be awarded cash, not property, to be paid 
within some reasonable manner, (see Exhibit "C" page 173, 
lines 14 through 20.) To have the order to pay $212,000 
lodge as a judgment is totally inconsistant with this ruling 
and creates a serious imbalance in the property distribution 
for the following reasons: 
1. In addition to paying child support and alimony of 
$24,000 per year, Respondent would have to pay Appellant 
$25,440 per year interest on the judgment. 
2. All of the Respondent's property would be encum-
bered by the $212,000 judgment preventing him from selling 
any parcel without first paying the judgment. 
3. The Appellant could foreclosure on her judgment 
thereby requiring the Respondent to sell his property in 
forced sales giving Appellant cash and stripping Respondent 
of all his property. 
The Trial Court's ruling clearly shows that the Trial 
Court did not intend to foist these problems upon the 
Respondent. To do so would bring about an unjust result. 
Respondent's position on this point is consistent with 
the rulings in Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. 
App.1987) and Stroud v. Stroud, 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (filed 
June 10, 1988). In that case the Trial Court, pursuant to 
an order to show cause, entered a judgment against the 
defendant for approximately $18,000 in unpaid child support 
and, thereafter, the defendant filed to stay execution and 
accrual of interest on the judgment so long as he made pay-
ments towards the judgment and met current child support 
obligations. The Trial Court ruled that it did not have the 
power or the authority to prevent the accrual of interest on 
the unpaid amount. The Supreme Court agreed and in so doing 
said first, that Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-4 (1986) 
clearly states that any judgment will bear interest at the 
rate of twelve percent (127©) per annum and second, that to 
allow a reduction as the defendant suggests would thwart the 
intention of the statute by rewarding those who withhold or 
are delinquent in child support payments. (In the instant 
case, if a payment becomes delinquent, Appellant is entitled 
to a judgment bearing interest at twelve percent (12%) on 
the unpaid amount. This will in no way thwart the intention 
of the statue by rewarding Respondent's delinquency.) 
On this point, the Trial Court's reasoning was sound, 
leading to an equitable ruling and the Findings and Decree 
herein should be corrected to be consistent with the ruling 
of the Trial Court. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) 
and Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
B. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by 
not awarding the Appellant attorneys' fees. 
Appellant's contention that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion and misapplied the law by not awarding her 
attorneys' fees is without merit. The Trial Court dis-
tributed assets in the manner suggested by Appellant (see 
Exhibit ffCf! attached hereby at pages 162 through 187 and 
page 173 at lines 18, 19 and 20), which gave Appellant cash 
both immediately upon entry of the Decree, see paragraph 7 
of the Decree, R.193, and over an eleven (11) year period, 
see paragraph 14 of the Decree, R.194. 
In this instance also, the Trial Court used sound 
reasoning as it ruled, after making the cash award to the 
Appellant, as follows: 
"I think in this case, I am not going to award at-
torneys fees on the basis that he is going to have 
a very difficult time making these payment as is. 
There is a lot of money, and the assets are now 
delinquent and I don't think I am going to award 
attorneys fees in this case. It don't find it is 
going to be any easier for him to pay them than 
for her, therefore no attorneys fees are going to 
be awarded." (Exhibit ,fAn at page 9, lines 13 
through 20.) 
The law is clear that in these matters, the Trial Court 
has wide discretion and its Findings will not be disturbed 
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof. Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
No such abuse exists here. 
CONCLUSION 
The record on appeal clearly supports the Trial Court's 
unambiguous rulings requiring Respondent to pay Appellant 
money over an eleven (11) year period and not requiring him 
to pay Appellant's attorneys1 fees. This Court should cor-
rect the Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce to make 
them consistent with the Trial Court's bench ruling, leave 
the Decree undisturbed regarding attorneys' fees and award 
Respondent his attorney's fees related to this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Dated 27th day of January, 1989. 
1 -^  ^--o/ 
/ Thotjr'as R«/Blonq\uis t 
/ , Attorney for Defendant 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to E. Paul Wood, 
attorney for Appellant, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah this 27th day of January, 1989. 
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IN TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
SHARON GARLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, 
Defendant, 
FILMED I 
Civil No. D87-772 
REPORTERS PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
February 17 & 18, 1987 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
DJ 
*&%(%* 
j 
MAR 181388 ^ 
By 
Deputy CJerk 
1 valued at $3,500; the coin collection valued at $12,051. 
2 MR. DOLOWITZ: I believe that is $1200, your 
3 Honor. 
4
 THE COURT: Excuse me. $1,251 is what I meant. 
5 And the gold and silver, I am going to rule does in fact 
6 exist, and he is awarded it in the amount of $5,000. 
7 He is also awarded and charged for the amount that was in 
8 the Tracy-Collins account at the time of the separation, 
9 $5,722.80. She is awarded charged for the amount in the 
10 two Valley Accounts $215. 
11 Let's see. As to the debt that supposedly is 
12 owing from the marriage to the dental laboratory, I don't 
13 -- that won't be included in the calculation. If that in 
14 fact is a debt, he will be responsible for it, but I am not 
15 going to add that to his liabilities. 
16 Now, if I have done my arithmetic right, and 
17 when you get these added up, you know, if I have done some 
18 arithmetic wrong, we will fix it. If I have done my 
19 arithmetic right, I figure he got in the separation 
20 $212,000, hefd have to give her to make this equal. And 
21 thatfs what I am going to require him to give to her and in 
22 this way: I am going to require that he pay to her $12,000 
23 in cash by July 1st, and then by December 31st he pay to 
24 her $20,000 in cash, and continue to pay that for the next 
25 ten years until that is fully paid. 
1 MR. PETERSON: $10,000? 
2 THE COURT: $20,000. $20,000 a year for ten 
3 years. And that will not accrue interest. And the reason 
4
 I am not adding interest onto that is because he is stuck 
5 with some very economic assets, unfortunately, and he is 
6 going to have to try to market the various pieces of real 
7 property and all those kind of things that she didn't 
8 want the responsibility for, and so I am not going to requirje 
9 him to pay any interest on that unless those payments 
10 become delinquent. If they do become delinquest, then he 
11 is going to have to pay them interest at the judgment 
12 rate they are past due. 
13 I think in this case, I am not going to award 
14 attorneys fees on the basis that he is going to have a 
15 very difficult time making these payments as is. There is 
16 a lot of money, and the assets are now delinquent and I 
17 don't think I am going to award attorneys fees in this case. 
18 I don't find it is going to be any easier for him to pay 
19 them than for her, therefore no attorneys fees are going 
20 to be awarded. 
21 I think I have covered all the issues. Is there 
22 anything else that needs to be brought before the Court? 
23 MR. PETERSON: Nothing I am aware of, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: If you will prepare the document and 
25 submit it to Mr. Dolowitz for approval as to form. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, NORA S. WORTHEN, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
do hereby certify that I reported stenographically the 
hearing which was held on February 17 and 18, 1988, and 
that the above and foregoing is a true and correct 
transcript of said proceedings at that time. 
Dated this 4th day of March, 1988. 
SM 
NORA S. WORTHEN, CSR, RPR, CP 
License No. 205 
My commission expires: 
December 27, 1988 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
./I 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) , ,7 / ^ ;
 t :-
of and for „ <//..., .*.„. ;Q /:IC.J£-
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL -c.-.yC.srs 
Attorneys for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
SHARON GARLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. D87-772 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * 
The parties in the above-entitled matter hereby 
stipulate and agree that this court should, pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
amend paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce heretofore made 
and entered in this matter on or about the 3rd day of MnW*hf 
1988, so that the last sentence of that paragraph shall 
provide: 
In the event any payment shall become 
delinquent interest shall accrue on that 
payment at the normal interest rate 
allowed by law. 
DATED this ,/>/ day., of May, 1988. 
PETB&SON> 
or Plaintiff 
d2^u*^f_ •Jj£ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
oof"^^>: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
SHARON GARLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D87-772 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * 
The parties have presented to this court a stipulation 
that a clerical error was made in the last sentence of 
paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter 
on the 3rd day of Ma^4h, 1988, which should be corrected and, 
this court now finds and concludes that the Stipulation of the 
parties should be accepted and the clerical error made in 
paragraph 14 of the Decree corrected. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the last sentence of paragraph 14 of the Decree of 
nnr^^*? 
Divorce heretofore entered in this matter is amended to 
provide as follows: 
In the event any payment shall become 
delinquent interest shall accrue on that 
obligation at the normal interest rate 
allowed by law. 
DATED this Q t day of y&f, 1988. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT: 
PETERSON 
;ornaV for Plaintiff 
—^^jjfj^ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
ATTEST 
H. DVXO* H'MCJEY 
o«#*«y o»«* 
00L2C ! i ; 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
Civil NO. C87-772 
SHARON GARLAND, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAMES KENT GARLAND, ] 
Defendant, ] 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
February 17, 1988 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
District Court Judge Scott Daniels 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David S. Dolowitz of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
REPORTED BY: NORA S. WORTHEN, CSR, RPR, CP 
(801) 535-5344 
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Exhibit P-49, the first item on there is a home in South 
Jordan. Is it your desire that the Defendant should be 
awarded that property? 
A Yes. 
Q Why? 
A Because he has taken care of it all these years, 
and he would be best suited for that, and it has got a lot 
of work that needs to be done on it, and I wonft be able to 
do that. 
Q Can you afford to meet the mortgage payments on 
that property? 
A No. There is no way. 
Q The item is High Country Estates. That's the 
vacant land; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Why was that property purchased? 
A He was wanting to build solar homes on that, and 
so that's why it faces the south, and he was hoping to 
build more underground homes there. 
Q Is it your desire the Defendant be awarded that 
property? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you make the mortgage payments on that 
property if it is awarded to you? 
A No. 
162 
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Q 
generally 
A 
Q 
property; 
A 
Q 
A 
And there 
I wouldn,H 
The property at 534 Windsor Street, that's 
regarded as the Trolley duplex; is it not? 
Yes. Right. 
It is your desire the Defendant be awarded that 
is that correct? 
Yes. 
And why is that? 
Because he has dealt with it all from day one. 
is always things that need to be done on it, and 
t be able to make the payments if—you know, if 
one of the renters left. And that's why. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
either of 
duplex? 
A 
Q 
Is the home in need of some repair? 
Yes. 
Would you be able to perform those repairs? 
No. 
Have you had any dealings at all with these— 
the rental property, the South Jordan and Trolley 
No. 
Do you believe you have the ability to deal with 
those satisfactorily? 
A 
Q 
No. 
Do you believe that if it is necessary to sell 
those, that Jim would have the better ability to sell them? 
A Yes. 
163 
1 Q The home furnishings you have already provided an 
2 exhibit to the Court which sets out your distribution you 
3 would like; is that correct? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And these figures come from that exhibit; is that 
6 J correct? 
7 i A Yes. 
8 I Q All of your vehicles as we have expressed before 
g are owned by the corporations. Is it your desire that the 
two Suzuki motorcycles be awarded to the Defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q And why is that? 
A Because I don't ride them. He bought them, and 
he has use for them. I don't. 
Q The Coleman folding trailer, is it your desire 
that be awarded to the Defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q Why? 
A Because I would never use it. I don't go 
camping. He does, and he could use it. 
Q The quadrunner, is it your desire that also be 
awarded to him? 
A Yes. 
Q Why is that? 
A Because he bought i t for himself. Tha t ' s what he 
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1 6 4 
1
 wants. He would use it. 
2
 Q The next item is Garland Dental Lab. Is it your 
3
 desire that also be awarded to the Defendant? 
4
 A Yes. I think he should have it. I would take 
5 it, but he needs that for his income, so I guess he should 
6 have it. 
7 Q Are you willing in fact if the Court decides to 
8 take that asset, are you willing to take that in this 
9 divorce? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Do you think that you know how to run it? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Do you have the ability to run it? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Would it provide income for you if the Court were 
16 to award it to you? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Do you believe you could generate income in the 
19 same manner of the same type the Defendant has in the past? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q You don't believe that it would be expedient to 
22 order that awarded to you? 
A No. 
Q Sun Earth Corporation, which is essentially the 
23 
24 
25 home on Seven Springs, is it your desire the Defendant be 
165 
1
 awarded that? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And why is that? 
4
 A Because that's been his dream, and he should—it 
5 is a venture that he has set out to do, and I think he 
6 should finish it. 
7 Q That actually, as we have discussed, is your 
8 home, but it is held by the corporate entity; is that 
9 correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Has the Defendant throughout these proceedings 
12 asked for that home? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And is it your desire he be awarded the home as 
15 he has asked? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Have you always anticipated moving from that home 
18 I at the conclusion of these proceedings? 
19 i A Or until school is out. 
20 I Q That was actually my next question. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Is it your desire the Court allow you to remain 
in that home until school is concluded this year? 
A Yes. 
23 
24 
25 I Q And at that time you are willing to transfer it 
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4 
1
 to the Defendant's possession? 
2 A Yes. 
3 J Q Do you know, does the home—has the home been 
able to take advantage of significant tax writeoffs while 
5 it is being constructed? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Do you know if the home were taken out of Sun 
8 Earth and awarded to youf would that result in significant 
9 tax consequences to the corporation? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q But you believe that is an important 
12 consideration in making a determination to award the home 
13 to him? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q The last item on this page is the Hillside 
16 J Partnership; you have valued that at $15,000— 
17 i A Yes. 
18 | Q And it is your desire the Defendant be awarded 
19 
20 
that; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
21 | Q Why is that? 
22 | A Because he is involved with partnersf and that 
would be a sticky situation. His business is there. And 
it just wouldn't work out. 
23 
24 
25 | Q What wouldn't work out? You dealing with his 
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1 other partners? 
2 A Yes, and me dealing with him because his business 
3 I is there. 
4 Q That's where it is physically located? 
5 A Business is in the building. 
6 Q The Merrill Lynch CMA money fund is on the first 
7 page. On the next page you show that as an asset held by 
8 ] Garland Dental Lab; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q The Stuart James account, that's a stock account 
presently available for distribution. Is it your desire 
you be awarded that account? 
A Yes. 
Q You are willing to make the trades there as 
necessary and assume any losses or gains in that account? 
A Yes. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 l Q The next item is Blinder-Robinson & Company, 
presently hold $4,400 in the account, according to your 
husband's testimony; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your desire that if that in fact is in 
existence, it be awarded to you? 
A Yes. 
Q And if not, that it be awarded to him and 
assessed against him; is that correct? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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A Yes, 
Q You placed that in his column pending a 
determination as to whether it actually exists at that 
balance; is that correct? 
THE COURT: You don't have any independent 
knowledge of whether it exists or what it is worth? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q (By Mr. Peterson) The J T & C insurance stock, 
that is his father's company; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q That certainly should be awarded to him? 
A Yes. 
Q And you are not interested in more than face 
value on that; is that correct? 
A Right. Yes. 
Q The loose diamond, how much did you pay for the 
loose diamond? 
A Thirty-five hundred. 
Q Is it your desire that it be awarded to you at 
its purchase value? 
A Yes. 
Q Has the diamond ever been appraised at a higher 
value than that? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you believe that it is actually worth any more 
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1 than that? 
2 A No. 
3 Q The coin collection, you have asked the Court to 
4 award that to the Defendant. Why? 
5 A Because I don't know anything about the coin 
6 collection, and—I mean, I don't know—it is his and he is 
7 interested in the coin collection, so he can have it. 
8 Q The gold which you have testified existed 
9 J previously, is it your desire that you be awarded that 
gold? 
A Yes. 
Q The Tracy Collins checking account, that's the 
money which was in the account at the time you separated; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your desire and belief that the Defendant 
should be assessed the value of that account at the time of 
your separation? 
A Yes. 
Q The Valley Bank checking and savings account, 
those are your present balances; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And the Templeton World Fund, you are willing 
they should be divided between you equally as they are held 
in each of your own names? 
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A Yes. 
Q Moving to the next page, which is the 
liabilities, regardless of what the liabilities are, is it 
your position that the Defendant should assume all of the 
outstanding liabilities on the real property? 
A Yes. 
Q Why is that? 
A Because I wouldn't be able to afford to make 
payment on them. 
Q That, then, would go hand in hand with your 
desire that he be awarded that property; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Kent Garland is his father? 
A Yes. 
Q You believe it is appropriate, I assume, that he 
pay off his father? 
A Yes. 
Q And you have taken a large note here, Phyllis 
Heward, you are willing to assume that note? 
A Yeah. 
Q And why are you willing to assume that note? 
A So I can make sure it gets paid. She is worried 
to death that she won't get it, so I need to make sure she 
gets it. 
Q Is that your mother? 
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A Yes. 
Q Do you believe that if the Court distributed 
these assets as you have prayed, that you should have 
sufficient funds to pay her off? 
A Yes. 
Q As to the expense you previously testified to, do 
you believe that the Defendant should assume the debt 
outstanding to Dr. Landau? 
A Yes. 
Q And he should assume his own Tracy Collins 
Mastercard? 
A Yes. 
Q You are willing to assume both the Nordstrom and 
Valley Bank Visa cards, which are yours in your own name; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: That Valley Bank Visa card, you said 
that was open at the time while you were married? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it was. 
THE COURT: What was the balance when you 
separated? 
THE WITNESS: Probably zero. I didn't use it for 
a long time. 
THE COURT: So this has been accumulated since 
the separation? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes. It had just barely been 
opened not even a year ago. 
Q (By Mr. Peterson) And the last, the Nordstroms 
and Republic Bank, is it your desire that any deficiency 
existing there, that the Defendant be directed to pay 
those? 
A Yes. 
Q Those were debts that were incurred prior to your 
separation; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Then the last page is a division of the assets as 
you proposed to the Court; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your desire that the Court accept your 
value, that he direct the Defendant to pay you the cash 
funds necessary to equalize your estate? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it your desire that he be directed to pay that 
within some reasonable time in some reasonable manner? 
A Yes. 
(Proceedings had at this 
point have been 
previously transcribed 
at the request of 
counsel.) 
/// 
/// 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DOLOWITZ: 
Q Mrs. Garland, do you have available to you your 
Exhibit 43, your Plaintiff's Monthly Expenses? I can ask 
the questions, Your Honor. I will give her an amount. 
Mrs. Garland, you say rent or mortgage payment. 
You don't have presently a rent or mortgage payment? 
A Right. 
Q And you haven't had a rent or mortgage payment 
during the pendency of this action? 
A Right. 
Q You also put in taxes and insurance. You have 
not had taxes or insurance payments during the pendency of 
this action; is that correct? 
A I have had insurance. 
Q You have paid the real property tax and insurance 
on your home? 
A I have paid insurance. 
Q You paid the insurance on the home owned by Sun 
Earth Corporation? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q That was $100 a month? 
A It has been $67 a month for just insurance. 
Q What type of insurance is it that you purchased 
and paid? 
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A 
when we 
Q 
the 67? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Full coverage on a home. It is what we purchased 
first moved in. It is the typical homeowners. 
And that is something you have paid each month, 
Yes. 
Have you paid any maintenance? 
Yes. 
You have paid maintenance? 
Yes, I have. 
$80 a month worth? 
Yes, or sometimes more. 
Now, since you have made those payments, you made 
those payments by check? 
A 
checks 
And those checks would show up as part of the 
that you produced to us when we asked you to make 
those checks available for examination? 
A 
Q 
$437 a 
A 
Q 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
You also indicated food and household expenses of 
month? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And that is also in checks that you made—you 
paid for that by checks, which you made available for us 
when we 
A 
Q 
inspected your checks? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Now, you have indicated clothing of $150. 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
that you 
A 
you have 
Q 
will that 
A 
Yes. 
Is that for you and for the children? 
Yes. 
And that will also appear as part of the checks 
have produced for us? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: I know it is hard to remember, but 
really got to remember to say yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 
(By Mr. Dolowitz) When you say entertainment, 
also appear in the checks, the $400 a month? 
Yes. There is a lot of times—sometimes I pay 
cash, I mean, but then sometimes I will write a check for 
cash, and 
Q 
then I will use cash when we do something. 
You indicated that you think you will have a $350 
a month auto payment, and that's because you chose a 
$13,000 automobile? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Did you look for a less expensive automobile? 
No. 
You didn't think a less expensive automobile was 
more appropriate? 
A 
never had 
No. We have always had a brand new car. We have 
to buy a used one, and I thought that was very 
reasonable. 
176 
1
 Q I am a little confused by your testimony on 
2
 installment payments. You say that you planned on getting 
3
 credit cards? 
4
 A I have credit cards. 
5 Q And you always pay those current at the end of 
6 each month? 
7
 A I have. 
8 Q Then, there wouldn't be any installment payments, 
9 would there? 
10 A If I paid them off. 
11 Q Shouldn't they be included, if you are buying 
12 clothes in the clothes where you have charged those, or 
13 medical or dental, whenever you paid somebody off, that 
14 wouldn't be an installment payment, would it? 
15 A I don't know. 
16 Q You propose in the division of property to turn 
17 over a house for you and your husband owned by your 
18 husband, why don't you move into the house? 
19 A Are you talking return to the South Jordan home? 
20 Q The South Jordan home, if that's the home that 
21 you own. 
22 A Because it h a s — i t would need too much work. It 
is l i k e — t h e house is like a slum house now from having the 
renters there. It is pretty bad. 
23 
24 
25 Q You don't want that house awarded to you, then, 
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so you can turn around and sell it? 
need 
A 
Q 
No. 
Wouldn't it be appropriate if you feel you are in 
of money, for example, for a car, that you take that 
house and put it up for sale and sell it? 
now. 
and 
and 
home 
A 
It 
I need a car now. That would take longer than 
would take—I don't know how long it would take, 
my mom wants her car. 
Q 
make 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
and 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Aren't you proposing to sell it to your husband 
him cash you out right now? 
We didn't say right now. 
You said you need a car right now. 
Yeah. 
So you need cash right now? 
Yeah. 
But you are not willing to take the South Jordan 
put it up for sale? 
No. 
What is the condition of the duplex? 
It is pretty bad. It needs work. 
You are not willing to live there in either side? 
No. 
You just don't think it is appropriate for you? 
No, not with my kids. 
How many rooms are there in the duplexes? 
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1
 A There is—okay. He has made some in the attic. 
2
 He has made some rooms. I have never been up there, and 
3
 they are like studio—it is like a studio apartment in each 
4
 side, so there is really no bedrooms there. 
5 Q Are you willing to take that and sell it? 
6 A No. 
7
 Q Now, if I examine Exhibit 49, your proposed 
8 marital division, you are proposing that both the house and 
9 the duplexes go to your husband and you be paid for them. 
10 So in fact you are selling them to him, aren't you? 
11 A You could look at it that way. 
12 Q Aren't you willing to take them for the value you 
13 think they should be sold to him? 
14 A I don't want to have the responsibility of having 
15 to fix them up and worry about making the payments, and not 
16 knowing when I was going to be able to sell them. 
17 Q Then the values perhaps should be set lower and 
18 you want to sell them to him? 
19 A No. 
20 Q You are not willing to take them for this value? 
21 A I guess; I could. 
22 Q And then you would have control over what 
23 happened to them, wouldn't you? 
24 A If I—if I—yeah, I would. 
25 Q You would also have control over any income they 
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produced or could be produced by selling them? 
2 
3 
4 
A I wouldn't have very much control over anything 
if I had them. They would be in control of me. 
Q The High Country Estate landf is there anything 
5
 that stopped that land from simply being put up for sale? 
6
 A I don't know. Jim wants them, so I think he 
7
 should have them. He wants the Sun Earth to continue. I 
8 think he should have that so he can build more homes there. 
9
 Q Are you willing to take them at the price you are 
10 proposing to sell them to him? 
11 A No. 
12 Q So if they were awarded to him, maybe the price 
13 should be lower? 
14 A No. 
15 Q You are not willing to take them at that price? 
16 A I believe he should have them. I really think he 
17 would like that property. 
18
 Q Those are three properties that you could take, 
19 put up for sale, liquidate and turn into cash by yourself, 
20 couldn't you? 
21 A N o . 
22 Q You can't turn them into cash? You can't put 
23 them up for sale? 
24 A It would be r e a l l y — i t w o u l d — I haven't ever done 
25 anything like that before. I would have to go in and do a 
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1
 lot o f — d o stuff that I have never done before, and Jim is 
2 accustomed to handling that, and I think he would be better 
3
 off dealing with it. 
4
 Q Do you think he is entitled to any compensation 
5 if he has to do that? 
« A No. 
7 Q He should just simply do it? 
8 I A If he wants to sell them. He doesn't have to 
9 sell them. He can keep them and keep the income like what 
10 he has been doing. 
11 Q In fact you are selling them to him? 
12 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, he has asked that 
13 question now the fourth time. 
14 THE COURT: Sustained. 
15 Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) Do you have Exhibit 45, the 
16 furnishings which you are proposing to divide? 
17 You could in fact sell them t o — b e willing to 
18 sell them to him if the Court accepts this proposal? 
19 This I have to go over and over item by item. 
20 THE COURT: Do you have any other copies, 
21 Mr. Peterson? 
22 MR. PETERSON: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) As I understand Exhibit 45-P, 
Mrs. Garland, it is your proposal that you value these 
items and you will take some and you will give some to your 
23 
24 
25 
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husband? 
A Yeah. 
Q You have proposed for example, the fourth item 
down, four coolers. You say those are worth $50. Are you 
willing to let your husband take those for $50? 
A It doesn't really matter. 
Q Then he could have them? 
A If he wants. 
Q And they could be valued at that? 
You have proposed in here a table saw. Doesn't 
that table saw in fact belong to Sun Earth? 
A No. 
Q Isn't that in fact one of the tools that is 
included in the inventory on Sun Earth Corporation when Mr, 
Dorton said that there are depreciated present value of 
tools and equipment owned by Sun Earth? 
A He might say there is tools. So far as I know, 
it is not Sun Earth's. 
Q And if your husband were to indicate that is on 
the inventory of Sun Earth, you would not be in a position 
to disagree, would you? 
A No, I wouldn't. 
Q You have offered some water skis to your husband 
at $3 0. Don't those in fact belong to your husband's 
sister? 
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A Water skis? 
Q Water skis. 
A I don't know. 
Q And if they do in fact belong to your husband's 
sister, you are giving them to him at $3 0 when they belong 
to her? 
A If they are his sister's, then I don't have any 
right to give them to anybody. But I assumed it was his— 
they were his. 
Q There are two 12-speed bikes that you have valued 
at $500 given to you. Is there any reason why you did not 
give one to each of you—one to you and one to your 
husband? 
A Because one of them is mine and one of them can 
go to him. 
THE COURT: About halfway down the list. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Well, they are worth $500 
each or maybe $500 together. One of them is for him and 
one for me. 
Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) Has there been an omission— 
should there be an indication that one goes to him? 
A Yeah, because he has got his already. 
Q The next three items below that are two stepping 
stools, a drill press, tools—aren't those the property of 
Sun Earth Corporation? 
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1 A Not that I know of. 
2 Q Aren't they carried as part of the tools that 
3 were purchased by Sun Earth for building of the home and 
4 included in the inventory by Mr. Dorton where he has said 
5 there are tools and equipment purchased by Sun Earth for 
6 construction purposes? 
7 A I wasn't aware of that. 
8 Q Isn't that also true of the Craftsman folding 
9 table and heavy-duty extension cords? 
A No. 
Q As well as the two large gas tanks, a small gas 
12 tank? 
13 A No. The large—let's see. The large gas tankf 
14 it is possible. No. No. They were recreational gas 
15 tanks. 
16 Q You don't know if those were purchased by Sun 
17 Earth or not? 
18 MR. PETERSON: She has answered no. 
19 MR. DOLOWITZ: No. You don't know? 
20 THE WITNESS: I don't believe they are Sun 
21 Earth's. 
22 Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) And if they were carried on 
23 the inventory of Sun Earth, then that would indicate they 
24 were purchased by Sun Earth? 
25 A I suppose. 
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1
 Q If you would turn to page 2 about the tenth item 
2
 down is a hanging chair that you valued at $150. Do you 
3
 want that at $150? 
4
 A No. 
5
 Q Have I advised you that at $150, your husband 
6
 doesn't want it either? Would you want it? 
7
 A Yes. 
8 Q At any value at all? 
9 A At $150. 
10 Q You will take it at $150? 
11 A But he is the one that bought it and he is the 
12 one that wanted it, so I think he should have it and we 
13 just bought it a year ago. 
14 Q If I told you that he said you should have it at 
15 $150, would you accept it? 
16 A Well, I would rather him have it because he 
17 wanted it. That's—I don't really care for it. S o — 
18 THE COURT: Was $150 the original purchase price? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: That was one year ago? 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. And he has a place where he 
22 wants to hang it in the house, so he might as well use it. 
23 Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) Four rifle cases and scope. 
24 Those are the ones that is in response to your having 
25 shopped around to get that value? 
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A Yes. 
Q Didn't Jim own those before the marriage? 
A He had one gun and I don't know exactly which one 
it was. 
Q In fact, didn't he own all four rifles before he 
was married? 
A Yes. I know he bought guns after our marriage, 
but I don't know exactly which ones. 
Q You also listed a stuffed duck. Are you willing 
to take the stuffed duck at 150? 
A That's his duck that he shot and he had stuffed. 
He is the one. I think he should have it. He has a 
collection of his animals. He wants it. 
Q If I told you that at 150 he is willing that you 
can have the stuffed duck, do you want a $150 stuffed duck? 
A What is the value? 
Q My question is do you want a $150 stuffed duck if 
he doesn't at $150? 
A No. 
Q But if the price goes down, you might be 
interested? 
A I don't want the duck. 
Q At $150, that duck may have trouble finding a 
home. 
THE COURT: What, is this like a trophy? Is it a 
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duck that you take into a— 
THE WITNESS: Taxidermist. 
THE COURT: —and have it mounted? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. And I just thought that 
that's what it looked like it would be worth. 
THE COURT: Does it have a plaque that hangs on 
the wall? 
THE WITNESS: It is really nice looking. I 
mean— 
THE COURT: But at $150, it is not nice enough? 
THE WITNESS: I didn't call for that. I looked 
at it and thought that it looked like $150. 
Q (By Mr. Dolowitz) Did Jim have the stuffed pig 
before you were married? 
A Yes. 
Q So when you valued that at $250, give it back to 
him? It has kind of appreciated a bit during the marriage. 
There is a horse sculpture for $100. Didn't Jim 
make that while he was in school? 
A While we were married. 
Q I see. At $100f would you like that sculpture? 
A Yes, I would. It is real nice. 
Q Jim is talented? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: We will take a ten-minute recess 
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